کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
4959596 | 1445949 | 2017 | 12 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Almost budget balanced mechanisms with scalar bids for allocation of a divisible good
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
تقریبا مکانیسم تعادل بودجه با پیشنهادات اسکالر برای تخصیص یک محصول قابل تقسیم
دانلود مقاله + سفارش ترجمه
دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی
رایگان برای ایرانیان
کلمات کلیدی
مزایده / مزایده، نظریه بازی، اقتصاد، برنامه ریزی خطی، برنامه محدب نامعلوم،
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه
مهندسی کامپیوتر
علوم کامپیوتر (عمومی)
چکیده انگلیسی
This paper is about allocation of an infinitely divisible good to several rational and strategic agents. The allocation is done by a social planner who has limited information because the agents' valuation functions are taken to be private information known only to the respective agents. We allow only a scalar signal, called a bid, from each agent to the social planner. Yang and Hajek [Yang, S., Hajek, B., 2007. “VCG-Kelly mechanisms for allocation of divisible goods: Adapting VCG mechanisms to one-dimensional signals”, IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications 25 (6), 1237-1243.] and Johari and Tsitsiklis [Johari, R., Tsitsiklis, J. N., 2009. “Efficiency of scalar-parameterized mechanisms”, Operations Research 57 (4), 823-839.] proposed a scalar strategy Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (SSVCG) mechanism with efficient Nash equilibria. We consider a setting where the social planner desires minimal budget surplus. Example situations include fair sharing of Internet resources and auctioning of certain public goods where revenue maximization is not a consideration. Under the SSVCG framework, we propose a mechanism that is efficient and comes close to budget balance by returning much of the payments back to the agents in the form of rebates. We identify a design criterion for almost budget balance, impose feasibility and voluntary participation constraints, simplify the constraints, and arrive at a convex optimization problem to identify the parameters of the rebate functions. The convex optimization problem has a linear objective function and a continuum of linear constraints. We propose a solution method that involves a finite number of constraints, and identify the number of samples sufficient for a good approximation.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: European Journal of Operational Research - Volume 262, Issue 3, 1 November 2017, Pages 1196-1207
Journal: European Journal of Operational Research - Volume 262, Issue 3, 1 November 2017, Pages 1196-1207
نویسندگان
D. Thirumulanathan, H. Vinay, Srikrishna Bhashyam, Rajesh Sundaresan,