کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
4959747 1445958 2017 11 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Design and analysis of mechanisms for decentralized joint replenishment
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
طراحی و تجزیه و تحلیل مکانیزم های تکمیل مشترک غیر متمرکز
کلمات کلیدی
نظریه بازی، فهرست، دوباره پر کردن مشترک، مدل سفارش قیمت اقتصادی، طراحی مکانیسم،
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه مهندسی کامپیوتر علوم کامپیوتر (عمومی)
چکیده انگلیسی
We consider jointly replenishing multiple firms that operate under an EOQ like environment in a decentralized, non-cooperative setting. Each firm's demand rate and inventory holding cost rate are private information. We are interested in finding a mechanism that would determine the joint replenishment frequency and allocate the joint ordering costs to these firms based on their reported stand-alone replenishment frequencies (if they were to order independently). We first provide an impossibility result showing that there is no direct mechanism that simultaneously achieves efficiency, incentive compatibility, individual rationality and budget-balance. We then propose a general, two-parameter mechanism in which one parameter is used to determine the joint replenishment frequency, another is used to allocate the order costs based on firms' reports. We show that efficiency cannot be achieved in this two-parameter mechanism unless the parameter governing the cost allocation is zero. When the two parameters are same (a single parameter mechanism), we find the equilibrium share levels and corresponding total cost. We finally investigate the effect of this parameter on equilibrium behavior. We show that properly adjusting this parameter leads to mechanisms that are better than other mechanisms suggested earlier in the literature in terms of fairness and efficiency.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: European Journal of Operational Research - Volume 259, Issue 3, 16 June 2017, Pages 992-1002
نویسندگان
, , ,