Pricing scheme design of ridesharing program in morning commute problem

This paper examines the dynamic user equilibrium of the morning commute problem in the presence of ridesharing program. Commuters simultaneously choose departure time from home and commute mode among three roles: solo driver, ridesharing driver, and ridesharing rider. Considering the congestion evolution over time, we propose a time-varying compensation scheme to maintain a positive ridesharing ridership at user equilibrium. To match the demand and the supply of ridesharing service over time, the compensation scheme should be set according to the inconvenience cost functions and the out-of-pocket cost functions. When the price charged per time unit is higher than the inconvenience cost per time unit perceived by the ridesharing drivers, the ridesharing participants will travel at the center of peak hours and solo drivers will commute at the two tails. Within the feasible region with positive ridership, the ridesharing program can reduce the congestion and all the commuters will be better off. To support system optimum (SO), we derive a time-varying toll combined with a flat ridesharing price from eliminating queuing delay. Under SO toll, the ridesharing program can attract more participants and have an enlarged feasible region. This reveals that the commuters are more tolerant to the inconvenience caused by sharing a ride at SO because of the lower travel time. Compared with no-toll equilibrium, both overall congestion and individual travel cost are further reduced at SO.