The effects of rules and communication in a behavioral irrigation experiment with power asymmetries carried out in North China

In our field experiment carried out with stakeholders from the Chinese Haihe River Basin, a group of five players located along an irrigation channel first decide on the amount they would invest in a public fund for channel maintenance. In the next step, they choose the amount of water to withdraw from the channel to irrigate their plots of land. We compare the effects of different rules of water distribution and communication on three types of group participants: farmers, water administrators and students.The power asymmetry in the location along the irrigation channel was the most important factor affecting players' investment and water harvest decisions. The introduction of rules of water distribution only weakly altered the effect of power asymmetry but communication and the ability to modify the rules did reduce the effects. This result was strongest among the students and administrators and weakest among the farmers. In addition, farmers tended to break the rules more frequently and withdraw more water than agreed upon.