کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5050498 | 1476409 | 2011 | 7 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |

Norms regarding private provision of a public good (e.g. cutting down on energy use, not littering) can affect the marginal gains from contributing to a public good and therefore people's decisions about contributing to the public good. A model is proposed in which norms of private contributions to a public good can be influenced by public policy, and these norms affect people's self-image, which derives from a comparison of one's own contribution with the norm contribution. In this context, we examine the conditions under which private contributions to a public good are efficient, and the conditions under which policy affecting these norms improves social welfare. We find that (1) a benevolent social planner who fails to account for private provision norms will underprovide the public good, and (2) public policy that attempts to raise the norm contribution of private provision can increase social welfare if the effect of raising the norm does not have an extreme negative effect - either extremely small or extremely large - on peoples' self-image.
⺠We examine efficiency and welfare implications of norm influence by policy-makers. ⺠Norms affect self-image which can be improved by contributing to a public good. ⺠A benevolent dictator failing to consider self-image underprovides the public good. ⺠If norm policy does not have an extreme effect on self-image, welfare increases.
Journal: Ecological Economics - Volume 70, Issue 12, 15 October 2011, Pages 2327-2333