International outsourcing of skill intensive tasks and wage inequality

Within the context of a product variety model, this paper examines the impact of international outsourcing of some skill intensive tasks on wage inequality. We consider four possibilities: long-run equilibrium where varieties of producer services are non-traded, long-run equilibrium where varieties of producer services are traded, short-run equilibrium where varieties of producer services are non-traded and short-run equilibrium where varieties of producer services are traded. It is shown that in each case, under certain conditions, international outsourcing can increase skilled-unskilled wage inequality. In the first three cases, outsourcing affects wage inequality directly as well as indirectly. In the short-run equilibrium, where varieties of producer services are traded, international outsourcing increases skilled-unskilled wage inequality only through an indirect channel. In the short-run equilibrium, where all goods are traded, the impact of outsourcing on wage inequality depends solely on the relative size of the income share of capital. Furthermore, in the long-run equilibrium, outsourcing increases the productivity of the industrial sector.

► Outsourcing affects wage inequality in the short-run as well as the long-run. ► The short-run results are different from the long-run results. ► When all goods are traded, the short-run results depend on income share of capital. ► Outsourcing of some skill intensive tasks enhances productivity in the long-run.