کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5055331 | 1371489 | 2009 | 9 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Incentives in academic tenure under asymmetric information Incentives in academic tenure under asymmetric information](/preview/png/5055331.png)
This paper examines the incentives in academic tenure under asymmetric information where neither types nor actions of the agents are observable. The different contractual forms are compared, including short-term non-tenured contract and tenure contract with or without probationary period. It is shown that tenure track may help reduce information rent for the department in the situation where a smaller portion of high productive researchers are entitled to undertake very costly and time-consuming research project with a high potential value. However, when the probationary period cannot efficiently screen out the low productive researchers, providing both short-term non-tenured contract and tenure contract without probationary period or merely providing short-term non-tenured contract will be more likely taken by department. Therefore, the coexistence of different contractual forms in higher educational system, including the growing use of non-tenure track in some academic sectors can be economically explained.
Journal: Economic Modelling - Volume 26, Issue 2, March 2009, Pages 300-308