کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5058131 1476620 2016 4 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Does regret matter in first-price auctions?
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
آیا در مزایده های اول قیمت پشیمان می شوید؟
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی


- We test for the predictions of anticipated regret in first-price auctions.
- One human bids against three computers with pre-specified bidding strategies.
- Subjects randomly assigned to one of the two treatments.
- Treatment effects attributed to anticipated regret are not observed.

“Overbidding” with respect to risk-neutral Nash predictions in first-price auction experiments has been consistently reported in the literature. One possible explanation for overbidding is that participants in these experiments may try to avoid regret induced by the knowledge of winning bids in case they do not win these auctions. Such considerations may drive bidders to bid aggressively in first-price auctions. We test whether differences in how auction outcomes are revealed produces systematic differences in bidding. In our design, where individuals bid against pre-programmed computers, differences in revelation of winning bids, does not produce significant treatment differences. Our results are in contrast to previous experiments, which report systematic treatment differences based on whether winning bids are revealed or not.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Economics Letters - Volume 143, June 2016, Pages 114-117
نویسندگان
, ,