کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5058416 | 1476629 | 2015 | 5 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
- We question whether refunds increase efficiency in threshold public good games.
- New experimental evidence is provided on the importance of endowment size.
- Efficiency increases if and only if the endowment is small relative to threshold.
- We provide a novel approach to analyze when a refund is efficiency enhancing.
- Efficiency increases when zero contributions are likely in the absence of refund.
We revisit the question of whether a refund increases efficiency in threshold public good games. New experimental evidence is presented on the effect of endowment size. We demonstrate that a refund increases efficiency if and only if the endowment is small relative to the threshold. We also propose a novel way to analyze the effect of a refund. Specifically, we argue that a refund increases efficiency only if significantly many groups converge towards zero contributions in the absence of a refund.
Journal: Economics Letters - Volume 134, September 2015, Pages 29-33