کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5058817 | 1476634 | 2015 | 5 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
- Suppose penalties for first-time offenders are restricted.
- It is then typically optimal for the lawmaker to overdeter repeat offenders.
- Now suppose the restriction on penalties for first-time offenders is relaxed.
- Should overdeterrence of repeat offenders now be reduced?
- If the restriction was strong, then overdeterrence should actually be amplified!
When penalties for first-time offenders are restricted, it is typically optimal for the lawmaker to overdeter repeat offenders. First-time offenders are then deterred not only by the (restricted) fine for a first offense, but also by the prospect of a large fine for a subsequent offense. Now suppose the restriction on penalties for first-time offenders is relaxed; i.e., larger fines for a first offense become enforceable. Should overdeterrence of repeat offenders now be reduced? We show that this is the case only if the original restriction was not very strong. Otherwise, overdeterrence of repeat offenders should actually be further amplified.
Journal: Economics Letters - Volume 129, April 2015, Pages 116-120