کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5059207 1371778 2014 4 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Cartel size and collusive stability with non-capitalistic players
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
اندازه کارتل و استقرار رقابتی با بازیکنان غیر سرمایه داری؟
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی


- The acquired wisdom holds that market concentration facilitates collusion.
- This is true under profit-seeking behaviour.
- We show that the opposite applies in a labour-managed (LM) industry.
- All else equal, collusion is more likely in an LM industry than in a profit-seeking one.

A well established belief both in the game-theoretic IO and in policy debates is that market concentration facilitates collusion. We show that this piece of conventional wisdom relies upon the assumption of profit-seeking behaviour, for it may be reversed when firms pursue other plausible goals. To illustrate our intuition, we investigate the incentives to tacit collusion in an industry formed by labour-managed (LM) enterprises. We characterise the perfect equilibrium of a supergame in which LM firms play an infinitely repeated Cournot game under grim trigger strategies. We show that the critical threshold of the discount factor above which collusion is stable (i) is lower in the LM industry than in the capitalistic one; (ii) monotonically decreases with the number of firms.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Economics Letters - Volume 125, Issue 2, November 2014, Pages 156-159
نویسندگان
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