کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5059560 | 1371786 | 2013 | 5 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Persuasion and learning by countersignaling
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
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چکیده انگلیسی
We model countersignaling (i.e., very high types refraining from signaling) arising from the tradeoff between persuasion and learning in a signaling game. We assume that the agent has imperfect private information regarding his/her productivity, which the signaling action provides additional verifiable information about. A higher-type agent benefits more from providing such objective, albeit imprecise, “proof” for the market, but may also gain less from learning about his/her productivity. When the latter effect dominates the former for the very high types, the equilibrium exhibits countersignaling: very high and low types pool on refraining from signaling, and only the medium types signal. Under certain conditions, the countersignaling equilibrium is the unique pure-strategy perfect sequential equilibrium.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Economics Letters - Volume 121, Issue 3, December 2013, Pages 487-491
Journal: Economics Letters - Volume 121, Issue 3, December 2013, Pages 487-491
نویسندگان
Kim-Sau Chung, Péter EsÅ,