کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5060215 | 1371799 | 2012 | 4 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Testing post-cartel pricing during litigation
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
Harrington (2004) shows that conspirators can have incentives to maintain high prices after the cartel's discovery to reduce damages they are likely to pay. We exploit the existence of a discovered retail gasoline price-fixing cartel in the province of Quebec to test this theory. The empirical results provide some support for Harrington (2004)'s predictions.
⺠The title was changed to Testing Post-Cartel Pricing During Litigation. âºManipulated price was replaced by strategic price. ⺠The difference between residual collusion and strategic pricing is clear. ⺠The Connor and Bolotova (2006) reference was added and discussed. ⺠The assumption that antitrust sanctions are based on economic harm is made explicit.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Economics Letters - Volume 116, Issue 3, September 2012, Pages 339-342
Journal: Economics Letters - Volume 116, Issue 3, September 2012, Pages 339-342
نویسندگان
Can Erutku,