کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5060693 | 1371809 | 2012 | 4 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |

We show that any deterministic mechanism, for allocating identical items that are complements to budget-constrained bidders, cannot simultaneously satisfy individual-rationality, strategy-proofness, Pareto-efficiency, and no-positive-transfers. This holds even for two bidders, two items, and commonly-known budgets, and generalizes to richer settings.
⺠Study the allocation of identical items that are complements to bidders with budgets. ⺠Show that no deterministic mechanism simultaneously satisfies four desirable properties. ⺠Two properties are strategic: individual-rationality and strategy-proofness. ⺠Two properties are normative: Pareto-efficiency and no-positive-transfers. ⺠True even for two bidders, two items, and public budgets; extends to richer domains.
Journal: Economics Letters - Volume 115, Issue 1, April 2012, Pages 100-103