کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5063193 | 1372208 | 2012 | 32 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Corporate governance, agency problems and international cross-listings: A defense of the bonding hypothesis
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری
کسب و کار و مدیریت بین المللی
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چکیده انگلیسی
Why firms from around the world seek to cross-list their shares on overseas exchanges has intrigued scholars during the past two decades. A general dissatisfaction with the conventional wisdom about investment barriers segmenting global investors and how cross-listings overcome those barriers cleared the way for newer wisdom about informational problems and agency conflicts, and how firms could overcome weaknesses in corporate governance by listing on, and thus “bonding” to, overseas markets with stronger regulatory oversight, stringent reporting and disclosure requirements and investor protections. Critics have challenged the viability of the bonding hypothesis, which I answer in this review.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Emerging Markets Review - Volume 13, Issue 4, December 2012, Pages 516-547
Journal: Emerging Markets Review - Volume 13, Issue 4, December 2012, Pages 516-547
نویسندگان
G. Andrew Karolyi,