کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5064167 | 1476711 | 2016 | 11 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |

The major objective of this paper was to propose clearing and pricing models suitable for demand shifting bids in the efficient, but non-convex pool-based auction. Complex generators' offers bring non-convexities into the efficient auctions due to e.g. start-up costs and times. This paper focused on the responsive demands, introducing simple, yet adequate linear constraints into a multi-period bid/offer-based optimal power flow (OPF DC) model. As the standard locational marginal prices (LMPs) may not support the auction outcomes due to non-convexities, uplifts are needed to reduce generators' loss. Previous work has developed a minimum-uplift pricing model that directly optimizes prices, so that uplifts arising from generators' profit-suboptimality and simple, elastic demands' benefit-suboptimality are minimized. This work extended the mixed integer linear programming (MILP) formulation of the previous model to incorporate new linear constraints defining benefit-suboptimality of demand shifting bids. Furthermore, the transmission constrained market was attempted. As a result, the buyers were protected against over-curtailment; moreover, prices complemented with minimum uplifts were fair for both generators and demands. The models were validated on the literature-based cases, including IEEE RTS 24-node 24-hour system.
Journal: Energy Economics - Volume 53, January 2016, Pages 17-27