کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5067765 | 1372638 | 2006 | 24 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Career concerns in a simple experimental labour market
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
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چکیده انگلیسی
We experimentally investigate a simple version of Holmström's career concerns model in which firms compete for agents in two consecutive periods. Profits of firms are determined by agents' unknown ability and the effort they choose. Before making second-period wage offers firms are informed about first-period profits. In a different treatment firms additionally learn the abilities of agents. Theory suggests high first-period equilibrium effort in the hidden ability treatment but no effort elsewhere. However, we find that effort tends to be higher in the revealed ability treatment and therefore conclude that transparency does not weaken, but strengthen career concerns incentives.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: European Economic Review - Volume 50, Issue 1, January 2006, Pages 147-170
Journal: European Economic Review - Volume 50, Issue 1, January 2006, Pages 147-170
نویسندگان
Bernd Irlenbusch, Dirk Sliwka,