کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5067881 1476884 2016 17 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Local funds and political competition: Evidence from the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme in India
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
وجوه محلی و رقابت های سیاسی: شواهد از طرح تضمین اشتغال ملی در هند
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی


- This paper looks at the impact of politics in public fund allocation decisions.
- Studies the impact of local political bodies in affecting fund allocated for National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS)
- Finds that greater funds are allocated to where seat share of the ruling INC party is lower
- 1.5 percentage point greater funds are allocated where the seat share of INC in the block council is lower by 1 percentage point.
- Results are only obtained when the authorizing authority is from INC.

The National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) in India is one of the largest public employment programs in the developing world. It was introduced by the central government led by Indian National Congress (INC). While it's implementation is, in principle, based on demand for work from households, we investigate how political competition affects intra district allocation of funds under the scheme. Using longitudinal data on funds allocated to blocks and elections held for block councils, we find that greater amount of funds were allocated to blocks where INC had lower seat share. Further, we address the issue of endogeneity by focusing on a subsample of blocks where the aggregate vote share of INC was close to that of it's rivals. Our results suggest that 1.5 percentage point more funds were approved for blocks that had 1 percentage point lower seat share for INC. We also provide a mechanism for the effect by showing that the results are only true when the MP of the district, a member of the body that approves the block fund allocation, is from INC.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: European Journal of Political Economy - Volume 41, January 2016, Pages 14-30
نویسندگان
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