|کد مقاله||کد نشریه||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||نسخه تمام متن|
|5067936||1476887||2015||14 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||دانلود رایگان|
- We analyze elections as a method for processing conflict.
- In our model, incumbents can manipulate results, opposition can engage in violence.
- For peaceful, competitive elections, electoral chances must reflect balance of force.
- When outcomes make no difference competitive elections cannot co-exist with force.
- Elections deter violence when losers are offered the prospect of winning in the future.
We examine the conditions under which societal conflicts are peacefully processed by competitive elections when the contending parties can revert to force as an alternative. We show that the viability of the electoral mechanism depends on the balance of military force, the sharpness of divisions within a society, and institutions that moderate policies implemented by winners of elections. For elections to be held and their outcomes to be respected, the probabilities that they would be won by incumbents must bear an inverse relation to the magnitude of policy changes resulting from elections. Elections are competitive when their outcomes make some but not too much difference. Constraining the scope of policy divergence increases the range of the balance of force under which elections are competitive in divided, but not in homogeneous, societies. Hence, competitiveness of elections and constitutional constraints on policies - the norms being promoted as essential for democracies - do not always go together.
Journal: European Journal of Political Economy - Volume 39, September 2015, Pages 235-248