A vote at the opera? The political economy of public theaters and orchestras in the German states

- There is significant political manipulation of subsidies and jobs in German highbrow culture.
- Culture consumers are more likely to vote, engage in politics, and influence other voters.
- Electioneering: artist hiring goes up during state-level and municipal-level election years.
- Partisanship: left parties increase subsidies and artist employment, mainly in East Germany.

Policymakers generally have powerful incentives to attract votes by strategically manipulating public policies, for instance by increasing public spending during election periods or by implementing ideologically valued policies for their electoral base. At first sight, public theaters and orchestras appear an unlikely domain for such tactics. Highbrow culture is elitist and provides few jobs to artists as voters (patronage). However, we argue that policymakers indirectly target a larger highbrow culture-consuming voting public, as this public is more likely to go voting, to actively engage in politics, and to influence other voters' political behavior through political and sociological multiplier effects. We find evidence of such manipulation tactics in Germany, 1993-2010. Artist numbers increase during state-level, and even more during municipal-level, election years (electioneering). More tentatively, leftwing party power increases cultural subsidies and jobs in Eastern states.