کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5068279 | 1476902 | 2012 | 13 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: A simple and flexible alternative to Stability and Growth Pact deficit ceilings. Is it at hand? A simple and flexible alternative to Stability and Growth Pact deficit ceilings. Is it at hand?](/preview/png/5068279.png)
We model a monetary union where fiscal discretion generates excessive debt accumulation in steady state and inefficiently delayed debt adjustment following shocks. By setting a debt target and raising the political cost of deviating from the optimal pace of debt reversal¸ institutional design induces fiscal policymakers to implement unbiased responses to shocks. This is partly achieved by increasing the transparency of the decision-making process. We therefore call for more focused supervision tasks for the European Commission and for parliamentary discussion whenever a disagreement arises between the Commission and a national government.
⺠EMU fiscal policies are often expansionary in good times and vice versa. ⺠Transparency allows national voters to discipline fiscal decisions. ⺠We advocate a transparent flexible debt targeting approach. ⺠Emu institutions should enforce the transparency of fiscal decisions. ⺠We outline a proposal for improving the transparency of the current EMU institutional framework.
Journal: European Journal of Political Economy - Volume 28, Issue 1, March 2012, Pages 14-26