کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5068318 | 1476916 | 2008 | 16 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Inside and outside the central bank: Independence and accountability in financial supervision
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
This paper analyzes recent trends in, and determinants of, financial supervisory governance inside and outside central banks. We first review the case for supervisory independence and accountability in order to frame the econometric work on their determinants. We then calculate the levels of supervisory independence and accountability in 55 countries, disentangling similarities and differences among central banks and pure financial supervisors. The empirical analysis of the determinants indicates that the quality of public sector governance plays a decisive role in establishing accountability arrangements, more than independence arrangements. It also shows that decisions regarding levels of independence and accountability are not well-connected. The results also show that the likelihood for establishing governance arrangements suitable for supervision is higher when the supervisor is located outside the central bank.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: European Journal of Political Economy - Volume 24, Issue 4, December 2008, Pages 833-848
Journal: European Journal of Political Economy - Volume 24, Issue 4, December 2008, Pages 833-848
نویسندگان
Donato Masciandaro, Marc Quintyn, Michael W. Taylor,