کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5068344 1476909 2010 12 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Honor among thieves: Cooperation as a strategic response to functional unpleasantness
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Honor among thieves: Cooperation as a strategic response to functional unpleasantness
چکیده انگلیسی

The assumption of self-interested behavior makes it difficult to explain cooperation among strangers. Economics experiments and game-theoretic analyses suggest that cooperation can arise from a willingness to punish noncooperative behavior, even at personal cost. Such behavior is often based on the notion that people who punish noncooperators value cooperation in itself. We show, by contrast, that people who like to cheat but also punish other cheaters - people who are Unpleasant, but who also have a strategic desire to avoid being punished themselves - can form the basis for widespread, even complete cooperation in society. Ultimately, such Unpleasant but strategic types can create conditions where all cooperate even though everyone would prefer to cheat.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: European Journal of Political Economy - Volume 26, Issue 3, September 2010, Pages 351-362
نویسندگان
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