کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5068352 | 1476920 | 2007 | 17 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Bank bailouts and political instability
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
This paper studies bank solvency crises due to macroeconomic shocks in a model where government is prone to bailout because of cronyism. Citizens can dismiss the government and overrule its decision if they believe that a bailout is not economically justified. The results are as follows. First, the probability of a political crisis in equilibrium increases with the scope of the political principal-agent problem. Second, political uncertainty enlarges the set of parameters for which a banking crisis takes place and thereby increases financial instability. Third, politico-financial crises may stem from foreign lenders' loss of confidence.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: European Journal of Political Economy - Volume 23, Issue 4, December 2007, Pages 821-837
Journal: European Journal of Political Economy - Volume 23, Issue 4, December 2007, Pages 821-837
نویسندگان
Victor Vaugirard,