کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5068368 | 1476920 | 2007 | 14 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Strategic wage setting, inflation uncertainty and optimal delegation
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
The paper examines optimal monetary policy delegation in an economy where wages are set strategically by a single economy-wide union whose objectives relate to employment and the real wage. Crucially, the central bank exerts imprecise control over inflation, giving rise to a positive relationship between the mean value of inflation and its variance. In this context, union concerns with regard to the employment goal render equilibrium sensitive to the conduct of monetary policy. As a consequence, optimal delegation arrangements closely resemble those identified as optimal in models that assume a direct aversion to inflation on the part of unions.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: European Journal of Political Economy - Volume 23, Issue 4, December 2007, Pages 1105-1118
Journal: European Journal of Political Economy - Volume 23, Issue 4, December 2007, Pages 1105-1118
نویسندگان
Phillip Lawler,