کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5068383 1476922 2007 31 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Divide et impera: Financial supervision unification and central bank fragmentation effect
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Divide et impera: Financial supervision unification and central bank fragmentation effect
چکیده انگلیسی

This paper analyses how the role of the central bank can influence the unification of the overall financial supervision architecture. We claim that the policymaker's choices can be viewed as a sequential process in which the institutional status quo matters. The degree of unification in supervision is decided based on the position of the central bank. If the central bank involvement in supervision and its reputation are high, the unification level is likely to be low, and vice versa. The central bank fragmentation effect can be explained through the three possible channels of moral hazard, bureaucracy, and reputation endowment effects. The empirical analysis-performed with ordered logit and probit functions on a dataset of 89 countries-confirms the robustness of the central bank fragmentation effect.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: European Journal of Political Economy - Volume 23, Issue 2, June 2007, Pages 285-315
نویسندگان
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