کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5068386 1476922 2007 19 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Candidate quality, pressure group endorsements and the nature of political advertising
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Candidate quality, pressure group endorsements and the nature of political advertising
چکیده انگلیسی

Candidates may vary in quality, where quality is some characteristic orthogonal to policy. This “simple modification” has for the most part defied integration into the Downsian framework. Here we add the following complicating factors. We consider the possibility that there are uninformed voters who are ignorant of the candidates' relative quality. However, a pressure group with inside information regarding the quality of the candidates may endorse one of the candidates as the high-quality candidate. We assume that the uninformed voters behave rationally in the presence of this endorsement. We demonstrate that truth telling by the pressure group is an equilibrium outcome. We also show that campaign endorsements by the pressure group are generally welfare improving even though the pressure group takes advantage of its private information.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: European Journal of Political Economy - Volume 23, Issue 2, June 2007, Pages 360-378
نویسندگان
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