کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5068500 | 1476912 | 2009 | 10 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
A contest model of liberalizing government procurements
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
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چکیده انگلیسی
This paper models liberalization of government procurements as admitting entry of foreign firms in a contest among potential rent seekers. It contributes to the literature on how institutions influence socially desirable outcomes. Liberalizing procurements reduces wasteful domestic lobbying but also increases the likelihood that a foreign firm will capture the rent. A main result is that the domestic welfare change is not monotonic in the foreign firms' abilities. Furthermore, we show that domestic liberalization policies can be inefficient from the global point of view because foreign lobbying costs can outweight productive efficiency.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: European Journal of Political Economy - Volume 25, Issue 4, December 2009, Pages 479-488
Journal: European Journal of Political Economy - Volume 25, Issue 4, December 2009, Pages 479-488
نویسندگان
Ngo Van Long, Frank Stähler,