کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5071333 1477055 2017 11 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Reaching consensus through approval bargaining
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
رسیدن به توافق از طریق معامله تایید
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
In the Approval Bargaining game, two players bargain over a finite set of alternatives. To this end, each one simultaneously submits a utility function u jointly with a real number α; by doing so she approves the lotteries whose expected utility according to u is at least α. The lottery to be implemented is randomly selected among the most approved ones. We first prove that there is an equilibrium where players truthfully reveal their utility function. We also show that, in any equilibrium, the equilibrium outcome is approved by both players. Finally, every equilibrium is sincere and Pareto efficient as long as both players are partially honest.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 104, July 2017, Pages 241-251
نویسندگان
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