کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5071479 | 1477061 | 2016 | 17 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Truncation strategies in two-sided matching markets: Theory and experiment
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
استراتژی های کاهش در بازارهای تطبیق دو طرفه: نظریه و آزمایش
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
We investigate strategic behavior in a centralized matching clearinghouse based on the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm. To do so, we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the degree to which agents strategically misrepresent their preferences by submitting a “truncation” of their true preferences. Our experimental design uses a restricted environment in which a particular form of truncation is always a best response. We find that subjects do not truncate their preferences more often when truncation is profitable. They do, however, truncate their preferences less often when truncation is dangerous - that is, when there is a risk of “over-truncating” and remaining unmatched. Our findings suggest that behavioral insights can play an important role in the field of market design.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 98, July 2016, Pages 180-196
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 98, July 2016, Pages 180-196
نویسندگان
Marco Castillo, Ahrash Dianat,