کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5071490 | 1477063 | 2016 | 17 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Formal versus informal legislative bargaining
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
رسمی و چانه زنی قانونی غیر رسمی
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
We study how the formality of a bargaining procedure affects its outcome. We compare a formal Baron-Ferejohn bargaining procedure to an informal procedure where players make and accept proposals in continuous time. Both constitute non-cooperative games corresponding to the same bargaining problem: a three-player median voter setting with an external disagreement point. This allows us to study formality in the presence and absence of a core and provides a natural explanation for the effects of preference polarization. Our results show that polarization hurts the median player and that formality matters. The median player is significantly better off under informal bargaining.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 96, March 2016, Pages 1-17
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 96, March 2016, Pages 1-17
نویسندگان
Adrian de Groot Ruiz, Roald Ramer, Arthur Schram,