کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5071564 | 1477065 | 2015 | 8 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Existence of monotone equilibrium in first price auctions with private risk aversion and private initial wealth
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
وجود تعادل یکنواخت در اولین مزایده های قیمت با انحراف ریسک خصوصی و ثروت اولیه شخصی
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
In this paper, we study the existence of monotone equilibrium in first price auctions where bidders have a three-dimensional private type, i.e. their private values, degrees of risk aversion and initial wealth. Bidders' utility functions belong to the class of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) or constant absolute risk aversion (CARA). The bidders' types are independent across bidders, while a bidder's private value, initial wealth and degree of risk aversion are allowed to be correlated. We show that a monotone equilibrium always exists in a general setting allowing for asymmetric bidders. Moreover, with symmetric bidders, a symmetric monotone equilibrium strategy must exist. A bidder's equilibrium strategy increases with bidders' private values and degrees of risk aversion. When bidders have CRRA utility, equilibrium bids decrease with initial wealth; when bidders have CARA utility, equilibrium bids are invariant to initial wealth.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 94, November 2015, Pages 214-221
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 94, November 2015, Pages 214-221
نویسندگان
Matthew Gentry, Tong Li, Jingfeng Lu,