کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5071620 | 1477062 | 2016 | 13 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Quantal response methods for equilibrium selection in 2Â ÃÂ 2 coordination games
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Quantal response methods for equilibrium selection in 2Â ÃÂ 2 coordination games Quantal response methods for equilibrium selection in 2Â ÃÂ 2 coordination games](/preview/png/5071620.png)
چکیده انگلیسی
The notion of quantal response equilibrium (QRE), introduced by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), has been widely used to explain experimental data. In this paper, we use quantal response equilibrium as a homotopy method for equilibrium selection, and study this in detail for 2Ã2 bimatrix coordination games. We show that the risk dominant equilibrium need not be selected. In the logarithmic game, the limiting QRE is the Nash equilibrium with the larger sum of square root payoffs. Finally, we apply the quantal response methods to the mini public goods game with punishment. A cooperative equilibrium can be selected if punishment is strong enough.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 97, May 2016, Pages 19-31
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 97, May 2016, Pages 19-31
نویسندگان
Boyu Zhang, Josef Hofbauer,