کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5071718 1477073 2014 20 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Fault tolerance in large games
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
تحمل گسل در بازی های بزرگ
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی

A Nash equilibrium is an optimal strategy for each player under the assumption that others play according to their respective Nash strategies, but it provides no guarantees in the presence of irrational players or coalitions of colluding players. In fact, no such guarantees exist in general. However, in this paper we show that large games are innately fault tolerant. We quantify the ways in which two subclasses of large games - λ-continuous games and anonymous games - are resilient against Byzantine faults (i.e. irrational behavior), coalitions, and asynchronous play. We also show that general large games have some non-trivial resilience against faults.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 86, July 2014, Pages 438-457
نویسندگان
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