کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5071895 1477076 2014 30 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Political motivations and electoral competition: Equilibrium analysis and experimental evidence
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
انگیزه های سیاسی و رقابت انتخاباتی: تجزیه و تحلیل تعادل و شواهد تجربی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی

We study both theoretically and experimentally the set of Nash equilibria of a classical one-dimensional election game with two candidates. These candidates are interested in power and ideology, but their weights on these two motives are not necessarily identical. Apart from obtaining the well known median voter result and the two-sided policy differentiation outcome, the paper uncovers the existence of two new equilibrium configurations, called 'one-sided' and 'probabilistic' policy differentiation, respectively. Our analysis shows how these equilibrium configurations depend on the relative interests in power (resp., ideology) and the uncertainty about votersʼ preferences. The theoretical predictions are supported by the data collected from a laboratory experiment, as we observe convergence to the Nash equilibrium values at the aggregate as well as at the individual levels in all treatments, and the comparative statics effects across treatments are as predicted by the theory.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 83, January 2014, Pages 86-115
نویسندگان
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