کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5072208 | 1373496 | 2012 | 16 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: A possibility theorem
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
It is well known that ex post efficient mechanisms for the provision of indivisible public goods are not interim individually rational. However, the corresponding literature assumes that agents who veto a mechanism can enforce a situation in which the public good is never provided. This paper instead considers majority voting with uniform cost-sharing as the relevant status quo. Efficient mechanisms may then exist, which also satisfy all agentsʼ interim participation constraints. In this case, ex post inefficient voting mechanisms can be replaced by efficient ones without reducing any individualʼs expected utility. Intuitively, agents with a low willingness to pay have to contribute more under majority rule than under an efficient mechanism with a balanced budget. Although this possibility theorem is not universal in the sense of Schweizer (2006), an asymptotic possibility is obtained for certain type distributions.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 75, Issue 1, May 2012, Pages 152-167
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 75, Issue 1, May 2012, Pages 152-167
نویسندگان
Hans Peter Grüner, Yukio Koriyama,