کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5072373 | 1373502 | 2011 | 15 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
On the elimination of dominated strategies in stochastic models of evolution with large populations
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
A stochastic myopic best-reply dynamics is said to have property (W), for a given number of players n, if every pure weakly dominated strategy in every n-player game is eliminated in the long-run distribution of play induced by the dynamics. In this paper I give a necessary and sufficient condition that a dynamics has to satisfy in order for it to have property (W). The key determinant is found to be the sensitivity of the learning-rate to small payoff differences, inherent in the dynamics. If this sensitivity is higher than a certain cut-off, which depends on the number of players, then the dynamics satisfies property (W). If it is equal to or below that cut-off, then the dynamics does not satisfy property (W).
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 72, Issue 2, June 2011, Pages 452-466
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 72, Issue 2, June 2011, Pages 452-466
نویسندگان
Christoph Kuzmics,