کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5072418 1373504 2010 17 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Minority voting and long-term decisions
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Minority voting and long-term decisions
چکیده انگلیسی
In this paper we propose minority voting as a scheme that can partially protect individuals from the risk of repeated exploitation. We consider a committee that meets twice to decide about projects including a first-period project that may have long-lasting impact. In the first period, a simple open majority voting scheme takes place. Voting splits the committee into three groups: voting winners, voting losers, and absentees. Under minority voting, only voting losers retain their voting rights in the second period. We show that as soon as absolute risk aversion exceeds a threshold value, minority voting is superior to repeated application of the simple majority rule.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 69, Issue 2, July 2010, Pages 329-345
نویسندگان
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