کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5072456 | 1373505 | 2010 | 20 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Moral norms in a partly compliant society
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
The article investigates social interaction among individuals who differ in their privately known motivation to comply with moral norms that are collectively rational in the sense that they maximize welfare given the distribution of moral motivation in the society. This yields tractable models of rule-consequentialism that can be tested with experimental data. The analysis focuses on two welfare principles: utilitarianism and complier optimality. The latter puts explicit welfare weight only on the type with the highest moral motivation. Already a simple model with two types is in line with a wide range of experimental stylized facts, like conditional cooperation, costly punishment, the role of intentions, or concerns for social efficiency.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 68, Issue 1, January 2010, Pages 255-274
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 68, Issue 1, January 2010, Pages 255-274
نویسندگان
Sebastian Kranz,