کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5072530 | 1373508 | 2010 | 8 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
The average tree solution for cooperative games with communication structure
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
We study cooperative games with communication structure, represented by an undirected graph. Players in the game are able to cooperate only if they can form a network in the graph. A single-valued solution, the average tree solution, is proposed for this class of games. The average tree solution is defined to be the average of all these payoff vectors. It is shown that if a game has a complete communication structure, then the proposed solution coincides with the Shapley value, and that if the game has a cycle-free communication structure, it is the solution proposed by Herings, van der Laan and Talman in 2008. We introduce the notion of link-convexity, under which the game is shown to have a non-empty core and the average tree solution lies in the core. In general, link-convexity is weaker than convexity. For games with a cycle-free communication structure, link-convexity is even weaker than super-additivity.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 68, Issue 2, March 2010, Pages 626-633
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 68, Issue 2, March 2010, Pages 626-633
نویسندگان
P.J.J. Herings, G. van der Laan, A.J.J. Talman, Z. Yang,