کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5072579 1373509 2008 15 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Arrow's Possibility Theorem for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Arrow's Possibility Theorem for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences
چکیده انگلیسی
In one-dimensional environments with single-peaked preferences we consider social welfare functions satisfying Arrow's requirements, i.e. weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives. When the policy space is a one-dimensional continuum such a welfare function is determined by a collection of 2N strictly quasi-concave preferences and a tie-breaking rule. As a corollary we obtain that when the number of voters is odd, simple majority voting is transitive if and only if each voter's preference is strictly quasi-concave.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 64, Issue 2, November 2008, Pages 533-547
نویسندگان
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