کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5072602 1373510 2008 24 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Why evolution does not always lead to an optimal signaling system
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Why evolution does not always lead to an optimal signaling system
چکیده انگلیسی
This paper gives a complete characterization of neutrally stable strategies for sender-receiver games in the style of Lewis, or Nowak and Krakauer [Lewis, D., 1969. Convention: A Philosophical Study. Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA; Nowak, M., Krakauer, D., 1999. The evolution of language. Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. USA 96, 8028-8033]. Due to the dynamic implications of neutral stability, the replicator dynamics of this model does not necessarily lead to the rise of an optimal signaling system, where every state of the world is bijectively linked to one signal and vice versa, but it can be trapped in suboptimum situations where two (or more) signals are used for the same event, or two (or more) events are associated with one and the same signal.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 63, Issue 1, May 2008, Pages 203-226
نویسندگان
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