کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5072624 1373511 2009 18 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Strong equilibrium in cost sharing connection games
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Strong equilibrium in cost sharing connection games
چکیده انگلیسی
We study network games in which each player wishes to connect his source and sink, and the cost of each edge is shared among its users either equally (in Fair Connection Games-FCG's) or arbitrarily (in General Connection Games-GCG's). We study the existence and quality of strong equilibria (SE)-strategy profiles from which no coalition can improve the cost of each of its members-in these settings. We show that SE always exist in the following games: (1) Single source and sink FCG's and GCG's. (2) Single source multiple sinks FCG's and GCG's on series parallel graphs. (3) Multi source and sink FCG's on extension parallel graphs. As for the quality of the SE, in any FCG with n players, the cost of any SE is bounded by H(n) (i.e., the harmonic sum), contrasted with the Θ(n) price of anarchy. For any GCG, any SE is optimal.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 67, Issue 1, September 2009, Pages 51-68
نویسندگان
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