کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5072810 | 1477083 | 2007 | 24 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Core structure and comparative statics in a hybrid matching market
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
Flexible firms compete by means of wages in the Assignment market while rigid firms have no flexibility over terms of appointment in the Marriage market. Workers trade with both kinds of firms in the hybrid market.Examples show that standard results that characterize the core of the Marriage market (respectively, Assignment market) are not robust to the entrance of flexible (respectively, rigid) firms to this market. A new algebraic structure provides a different characterization for the core of the hybrid model and reflects a sort of robustness to the exit of rigid (respectively, flexible) firms from this market. Meaningful comparative static results are derived.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 60, Issue 2, August 2007, Pages 357-380
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 60, Issue 2, August 2007, Pages 357-380
نویسندگان
Marilda Sotomayor,