کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5072866 | 1373520 | 2009 | 13 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions through lottery models
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
Effectivity functions for finitely many players and alternatives are considered. It is shown that every monotonic and superadditive effectivity function can be augmented with equal chance lotteries to a finite lottery model-i.e., an effectivity function that preserves the original effectivity in terms of supports of lotteries-which has a Nash consistent representation. The latter means that there exists a finite game form which represents the lottery model and which has a Nash equilibrium for any profile of utility functions satisfying the minimal requirement of respecting first order stochastic dominance among lotteries. No additional condition on the original effectivity function is needed.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 65, Issue 2, March 2009, Pages 503-515
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 65, Issue 2, March 2009, Pages 503-515
نویسندگان
Bezalel Peleg, Hans Peters,