کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5072889 | 1373521 | 2008 | 18 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Job-market signaling and screening: An experimental comparison
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
We analyze the Spence education game in experimental markets. We compare a signaling and a screening variant, and we analyze the effect of increasing the number of competing employers from two to three. In all treatments, efficient workers invest more often in education and employers pay higher wages to workers who have invested. However, separation of workers is incomplete and wages do not converge to equilibrium levels. In the signaling treatment, we observe significantly more separating outcomes compared to the screening treatment. Increasing the number of employers leads to higher wages in the signaling sessions but not in the screening sessions.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 64, Issue 1, September 2008, Pages 219-236
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 64, Issue 1, September 2008, Pages 219-236
نویسندگان
Dorothea Kübler, Wieland Müller, Hans-Theo Normann,