کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5072891 1373521 2008 22 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Strategic divide and choose
کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Strategic divide and choose
چکیده انگلیسی

We consider the classic cake-division problem when the cake is a heterogeneous good represented by an interval in the real line. We provide a mechanism to implement, in an anonymous way, an envy-free and efficient allocation when agents have private information on their preferences. The mechanism is a multi-step sequential game form in which each agent at each step receives a morsel of the cake that is the intersection of what she asks for herself and what the other agent concedes to her.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 64, Issue 1, September 2008, Pages 268-289
نویسندگان
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