کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5072902 1373522 2008 25 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions
چکیده انگلیسی

Bidders' asymmetries are widespread in auction markets. Yet, their impact on behavior and, ultimately, revenue and profits is still not well understood. This paper defines a natural benchmark auction environment to which to compare any private values auction with asymmetrically distributed valuations. The main result is that the expected revenue from the benchmark auction dominates that from the asymmetric auction, both in the first price auction and the second price auction. Moreover, for classes of distributions that lend themselves to a quasi-ordering of more or less asymmetric configurations, we prove that the expected revenue is lower the more asymmetric bidders are. These results formalize the idea that competition is reduced by bidders' asymmetries. Applications to merger analysis, joint bidding and investment are discussed.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 62, Issue 1, January 2008, Pages 1-25
نویسندگان
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