کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5072911 | 1373522 | 2008 | 15 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint Double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint](/preview/png/5072911.png)
چکیده انگلیسی
I consider the problem of assigning indivisible objects to agents, in which each agent pays a price for his object and all prices sum to a given constant. The objective is to select an assignment-price pair that is envy-free with respect to the agents' true preferences. I propose a simple mechanism whereby agents announce valuations for all objects and an envy-free allocation is selected with respect to these announced preferences. I prove that the proposed mechanism implements both in Nash and strong Nash equilibrium the set of true envy-free allocations.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 62, Issue 1, January 2008, Pages 140-154
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 62, Issue 1, January 2008, Pages 140-154
نویسندگان
Helmuts Äzacis,