کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5078417 | 1477364 | 2007 | 18 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Should auctioneers supply early information for prospective bidders?
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
Consider an auction in which potential bidders must sink an entry investment before learning their values, but where the auction designer can release information so that the bidders learn their values before entry. Such early information will induce screening of high-value bidders, and it will give rise to information rents and thereby a difference between the socially optimal auction and the auctioneer's preferred mechanism. Therefore, the auction designer has too weak an incentive to produce early information. Early information may increase or reduce equilibrium entry. If entry is sufficiently reduced, early information will harm the auction designer.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: International Journal of Industrial Organization - Volume 25, Issue 3, June 2007, Pages 597-614
Journal: International Journal of Industrial Organization - Volume 25, Issue 3, June 2007, Pages 597-614
نویسندگان
Steinar Vagstad,